Artificial Distinction and Real Discrimination

Elena Iñarra and Annick Laruelle
Journal of Theoretical Biology 305, 110-117.



In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies. KEYWORDS: Hawk-dove game, evolutionarily stable strategy.


A previous version of this work is: 


Discrimating by Tagging: An Artificial Distinction that Results in Real Discrimination, E. Iñarra and A. Laruelle, Ikerlanak Discussion Paper IL50/11, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Basque Country University UPV-EHU, Bilbao, Spain.


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