Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Heterogeneous Population

André Barreira da Silva Rocha and Annick Laruelle
Advances in Complex Systems 16(8)

 ABSTRACT

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

 


 

previously circulated under the title: Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Ikerlanak Discussion Paper IL6212, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Basque Country University UPV-EHU, Bilbao, Spain.

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