Stephane Gonzalez (Universite Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne)

Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of Core for Games in Effectiveness Form

Abstract

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a concept of core for games in effectiveness form (Rosenthal, 1972) that unifies a wide variety of solution concepts prominent in the literature on social choice theory and game theory. The characterizations we propose use the standard non-emptiness axiom, coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity properties together with an independence principle on the class of games with a non-empty core. This result gives new insights on characterization of well-known solution concepts such as the Condorcet winner or the Nash Equilibrium.

 

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